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 Abstract 
Europe has become a laboratory for recombining elements of citizenship. The paper suggests 
a matrix of citizenship dimensions (membership, rights and practices) and conceptions (liberal, 
republican and communitarian). The second part discusses three challenges to a monistic view 
of citizenship as a homogenous status and exclusive link between individuals and a singular 
political community. First, international migration leads to overlapping multiple citizenship 
through the proliferation of dual nationality but also “denizenship” rights for foreign residents. 
Second, claims for territorial autonomy by national minorities have resulted in the devolution of 
unitary states, creating thereby a nested multilevel citizenship that is also emerging in a 
different way in the European Union itself. Third, cultural rights of citizenship have been 
increasingly differentiated according to group membership in response to demands by cultural 
minorities for protection from discrimination, for special exemptions from general obligations of 
citizenship, or for public resources and recognition. 
Zusammenfassung 
Europa ist ein Laboratorium für die Rekombination unterschiedlicher Aspekte von citizenship. 
Der Text schlägt als analytischen Raster drei Dimensionen (Mitgliedschaft, Rechte und 
Praktiken) und drei Konzeptionen (liberale, republikanische und kommunitäre) von citizenship 
vor. Im zweiten Abschnitt werden drei Herausforderungen für eine monistische Auffassung von 
Staatsbürgerschaft als homogener Status und exklusive Bindung zwischen Individuum und 
einer einzigen politischen Gemeinschaft diskutiert. Internationale Migrationen schaffen 
überlappende multiple Bürgerschaften, die sich in doppelter Staatsangehörigkeit und 
“Wohnbürgerrechten” niedergelassener AusländerInnen manifestieren. Die Forderungen 
nationaler Minderheiten nach territorialer Autonomie führen zu einer Föderalisierung 
zentralistischer Staaten, wodurch eine ineinander verschachtelte Mehrebenen-Bürgerschaft 
geschaffen wird, wie sie in anderer Weise auch in der Europäischen Union entsteht. Kulturelle 
Bürgerrechte werden entlang von Gruppenzugehörigkeiten differenziert, indem kulturellen 
Minderheiten Schutz vor Diskriminierung, besondere Ausnahmen von allgemeinen 
Bürgerpflichten oder öffentliche Ressourcen und Anerkennung zugestanden wird. 
Keywords 
citizenship, liberalism, republicanism, communitarianism, national minorities, immigrants, 
multiculturalism 
Schlagworte 
Staatsbürgerschaft, Liberalismus, Republikanismus, Kommunitarismus, nationale Minderheiten, 
Einwanderer, Multikulturalismus  
  
Notes 
Dieses Working Paper ist mein fünftes in der Reihe Politikwissenschaft, die von meinem Freund 
Andreas Schedler 1992 initiiert wurde und zur Visitenkarte unserer Abteilung geworden ist. Mit Ende 
des Jahres 1999 verlasse ich das IHS. Ab Januar 2000 arbeite ich an einem dreijährigen 
Forschungsprogramm über “Die Grenzen politischer Gemeinschaften” an der Forschungsstelle für 
institutionellen Wandel und europäische Integration der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (rainer.baubock@oeaw.ac.at). Der folgende Text scheint mir für eine letzte 
Vorstellung besonders geeignet, da er einen Überblick über jene Themen bietet, die mich in den 
90er Jahren am stärksten beschäftigt haben. Das IHS war mir in dieser Zeit nicht nur Arbeitgeber, 
sondern auch akademische Heimat und Sprungbrett für das Eintauchen in die internationalen 
Debatten über politische Theorie. Was diese Zeit für mich produktiv gemacht hat, war das 
Engagement meiner KollegInnen an der Abteilung, die kritischen Fragen unserer StudentInnen, 
sowie last but not least die organisatorische und menschliche Unterstützung durch unsere 
Administratorin Gertrud Hafner. 
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What does it mean to be a citizen in Europe? Imagine a Kurdish immigrant who has been 
naturalized in France keeping, as most do, his Turkish passport. Using his right of free 
movement as a EU citizen he has recently settled in Germany. He can now vote there in local 
and European Parliament elections. He may also participate in general elections in France and 
Turkey if he cares to travel there to cast his vote. He is a citizen of two nation-states, of a 
municipality in another state and of a supranational union, and may yet feel to be a foreigner 
whose strongest political affiliation is with a stateless Kurdish nation that cannot offer him 
citizenship. 
In the wake of T.H. Marshall’s famous lectures of 1949 (Marshall 1965) most accounts of 
citizenship since World War II have focused on the evolution of legal rights and duties. Some 
have emphasized the widening circles of inclusion that have turned former slaves, workers, 
women or minor children into citizens. Many have cautioned that the equality of legal status 
and individual rights is not enough to overcome the effects of social exclusion. Yet until a few 
years ago, the allocation of citizenship between various political communities did not come up 
as a theoretical question. A citizen was assumed to be a member of a nation-state and of one 
nation-state only1 and each state had the sovereign right to control the gates of admission for 
new members. Today, no theory of citizenship can afford to ignore the bewildering complexities 
of multiple and ambiguous memberships illustrated in the case I have outlined above. 
In Europe three interrelated developments undermine the correspondence between state 
borders and boundaries of citizenship. First, immigration from non-European origins: While 
control over territorial entry is increasingly shifted towards European levels, resident immigrants 
have gained access to rights that were formerly regarded as privileges of national citizens.2 
Second, European Union citizenship: Its supranational conception of rights is still tied to legal 
nationality and cultural identities of the member-states, excluding thereby immigrants from 
third countries. Third, movements for national self-determination: The break-up of the Soviet 
Union, of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia has multiplied the units of citizenship and at the 
same time generated massive exclusion or expulsion of populations stranded on the wrong 
side of a new national border, while devolution in Spain, Belgium and the UK moves previously 
unitary states towards an asymmetric federalism3 and multinational citizenship. 
Citizenship in today’s Europe is no longer a homogeneous status and set of rights that defines 
a singular affiliation to a polity. Memberships overlap and rights are increasingly differentiated. 
But that does not mean that citizenship has lost importance in a globalizing society or that its 
core principles can no longer be spelled out and applied. Citizenship is rather like recombinant 
 
1 See Brubaker (1989:4). 
2 See Hammar (1990), Layton-Henry (1990), Bauböck (1994), Soysal (1994), Jacobsen (1996) 
3 The term was coined by Charles Tarlton who defined symmetric federalism as “the extent to which 
component states share in the conditions and thereby the concerns more or less common to the federal system 
as a whole” (Tarlton 1965:861). 
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DNA – it consists of a few easily identifiable elements that can be rearranged to generate a 
great variety of forms of political life. Europe has become a laboratory for cutting the different 
strands of citizenship and recombining them in novel, and sometimes disturbing, ways. The 
first part of this paper is concerned with conceptual differentiation and looks at recombinations 
of citizenship in political theory; the second part examines differentiated structures of 
citizenship that emerge from transnational migration and ethno-national conflict and deviate 
from a traditional model of membership in sovereign, closed and homogeneous political 
communities. My conclusion is that only a pluralistic understanding of citizenship can 
adequately reflect the growing fluidity and multiplicity of political, social and cultural ties, which 
relate individuals to various political communities. 
1. Thin and thick conceptions of citizenship 
Let us start with a preliminary and somewhat makeshift definition of citizenship as a status of 
equal and full membership in a polity and briefly explore the key elements of this definition. 
First, it uses the term ‘polity’ rather than ‘state’ or ‘society’. From an external perspective, the 
state can be seen as the basic unit of the international political system, while from an internal 
one it is an ensemble of institutions exercising political authority in a certain territory. A polity 
is the population permanently subjected to this authority when seen as a political community. 
In contrast with the notion of civil society the concept of polity implies a discourse of political 
legitimation and a formal structure of membership. Political authority must at least claim to be 
in the common interest of those who are subjected to it. And the polity is understood as an 
intergenerational community whose members share in benefits and burdens which derive from 
living under a common political authority.4  
However, according to the definition, not any kind of membership in any kind of polity can be 
properly called citizenship. Citizenship requires equal and full membership and both 
qualifications combined presuppose a democratic political community, at least as a regulatory 
ideal.5 First, citizens are equal as members of the polity however unequal they may be in other 
social spheres. And, second, citizenship is full membership when it is linked to the notion of 
popular sovereignty. Political authority is not merely exercised on behalf of the citizens, but 
they are understood to collectively rule themselves by mandating all such authority. Full 
membership implies therefore comprehensive powers as well as an inclusive definition of the 
 
4 See Bauböck (1998) for a more extensive discussion of the difference between polity, society and cultural 
community. 
5 Democracy serves as a regulatory ideal for citizenship in three different ways: first, in non-democratic 
regimes where individuals are citizens merely in the narrow sense of legal nationality but otherwise subjects 
exposed to arbitrary exercises of power – in such regimes individuals may nevertheless engage in citizenship 
practices of resistance for which democracy serves as an ideal; second, in transitions to democracy when the 
political institutions that sustain citizenship rights are being built; and, third, in established liberal democracies as a 
corrective against the monopolization of politics by a professional elite. 
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set of persons who are members of the polity. Let me give two counterexamples: Multiple votes 
for members of specific groups would make citizenship unequal, while a denial of the franchise 
for certain groups creates partial citizens. J.S. Mill’s endorsement of multiple votes for 
educated élites would have created unequal political citizenship (Mill 1972:306-14).6 Minor 
children, inmates of prisons or psychiatric hospitals and foreign residents are residual 
categories of partial citizens in contemporary western democracies. 
These examples already show that the major benefit of citizenship lies in the rights that come 
along with membership. Rights are not an accidental side-effect, but a constitutive dimension 
of citizenship. The standards of equality and full membership can only be defined with regard to 
a comprehensive bundle of rights shared by all citizens. And these rights are not merely moral 
entitlements but are necessarily specified within a system of laws. As Jürgen Habermas has 
explained, the basic rights of liberal democratic citizenship are those that citizens must 
mutually grant each other if they wish to regulate their coexistence by means of positive law 
(Habermas 1992:151-165). 
If membership and rights are two dimensions of citizenship, a third one is to regard citizenship 
as a practice. Sustaining citizenship requires some activity on the part of citizens. Imagining 
oneself as a member of a political community will have to be supported by practices of “good 
citizenship” ranging from narrowly political behaviour such as participating in elections to the 
ordinary virtues of civility in everyday life. While the institutions of liberal states do not 
necessarily depend on citizenship practices, the polity as an democratic community 
disintegrates when few citizens care to vote, when only tiny minorities engage in debates, 
associations or movements about issues of common interest, when laws regulating taxes or 
employment are routinely ignored, or when there is a general lack of trust in public encounters 
between anonymous individuals of different religious creeds, ethnic origins or phenotypes. 
Obviously, in a liberal democracy practising good citizenship is not an individual precondition 
for being a member and enjoying rights.7 However, a certain level of habitual citizenship 
practices will be necessary in order to support the imagination of a shared political community 
and to empower individuals through the system of legal rights. 
A comprehensive theory of citizenship has to address all three dimensions, but different 
conceptions emphasize and interpret them differently. One way to represent this conceptual 
field is to distinguish between thin conceptions, which regard citizenship as a strictly legal 
relation, and thick ones, which emphasize the aspect of community. Table 1 outlines how 
various thin and thick conceptions define citizenship along the three dimensions. 
 
6 It is interesting to note that the norm of equality applies only to the individual right to vote, not to the 
aggregate effects of representation which are often highly unequal in federal systems. For example, a Senator 
from California represents about 60 times as many voters as one from Wyoming. See Stepan (1999:26) for a an 
index of inequality of representation in the territorial chambers of twelve federal states.  
7 See Lister (1997:41). 
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Table 1: Conceptions and dimensions of citizenship 
   
CONCEPTIONS 
 
 thin  ¬¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾®  thick 
 
 
DIMENSIONS 
 
legal positivism 
libertarianism 
 
 
civic 
republicanism 
 
nationalism 
communitarianism 
 
membership 
 
legal status 
 
 
political identity 
 
cultural identity 
 
 
rights 
 
negative liberties 
 
 
rights as obligations 
 
moral duties 
 
practices 
 
passive citizenship 
 
 
civic virtues 
 
 
heroic virtues 
 
Membership 
At the thinnest end of the spectrum membership boils down to the notion of ‘nationality’ as it is 
used in international law. In this sense, nationality has nothing to do with being a member of a 
nation understood as a political and cultural community, but simply signifies a legal status that 
links individuals to states.8 Formulated within a framework of legal positivism this concept does 
also not carry explicit normative connotations. The relation is understood to be an empty one 
 
8 The same term ‘nationality’ can refer to a thin legal or to a thick cultural conception of membership, which is 
a source of considerable confusion in the literature. 
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that can be filled with various kinds of rights or obligations but does not conceptually 
presuppose any of those traditionally associated with citizenship.9 What it does presuppose 
are sovereign states that effectively exercise political authority not only in a territory, but also 
over a population who are the addressees of their laws. The basic relation is therefore one of 
subjection of individuals to states and of mutual recognition between states. Citizenship in this 
narrowest sense links individuals to states rather than to political communities and it does not 
distinguish between authoritarian and democratic regimes. 
At the other end of the spectrum citizenship is much more than merely one kind of 
membership in a specific type of association alongside others. It is a collective cultural identity 
that identifies for outsiders who the individual members of the polity are and for themselves how 
they ought to see each other. The thickest versions attribute a special importance to the polity 
as the largest collectivity that defines individual identities as well as the most important one to 
which all other identities are subordinated. This is characteristic for nationalist ideologies. 
There are, of course, many different varieties of nationalism. For ethnic nationalists the nation 
is first a cultural community that precedes the polity, for civic nationalists it is first a political 
community that assimilates all citizens into a shared culture. Although their starting points 
may differ, most nationalisms strive thus for congruence between political and cultural 
boundaries (Gellner 1983:1). 
Table 1 identifies civic republicanism as an intermediate conception. Republicanism is a 
broader and much older tradition than nationalism and reaches back via Rousseau to 
Machiavelli, the ancient Roman republic and, in certain interpretations, to Aristotle’s theory of 
the polity (Aristotle 1981).10 It differs from nationalism in its emphasis on the political rather 
than cultural nature of membership. Contemporary civic republicans often contrast citizenship 
with national identity. The former signifies a collective identity of free members in a self-
governing polity sharing a common future, whereas the latter is regarded as an unreflective and 
ascriptive membership in a community of shared culture and origin (Viroli 1995). For civic 
republicans, citizenship must be strong (Barber 1984) rather than thick . It is a bond strong 
enough to unite the members of a polity who are thoroughly divided by their private interests. 
But this cloth is woven from universalistic principles and shows no particular ethnic patterns. 
Rights and obligations 
If we take the legal status of nationality as our starting point, the thickness of conceptions 
increases not only as we move towards the right column in table 1 but also as we move down 
the rows and add the dimensions of rights and practices to our theory. Although the content of 
rights of citizenship may be seen as indeterminate in legal positivist approaches, it is hardly 
 
9 See, for example, de Groot (1989:13). 
10 See Viroli (1995:117) for an attempt to draw a line between the ethnic particularism of Athenian democracy 
and the more universalistic thrust of Roman republicanism. 
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possible to deny that the very idea of the rule of law must address the citizen as a bearer of 
what the legal scholar Georg Jellinek called subjective public rights (1892). Hannah Arendt 
defended a corresponding view of citizenship as “the right to have rights” (Arendt 1967:296). 
She thought that being a citizen of a particular polity is a fundamental precondition even for the 
enjoyment of supposedly universal human rights. During the postwar period this ‘paradox of 
human rights’ has been resolved at the conceptual level, although certainly not yet in political 
practice, by including a right to citizenship in an expanding catalogue of human rights.11  
The specific rights of citizenship can be usefully distinguished along the well-known triad of 
civil, political and social rights developed by T.H.Marshall and half a century before in quite 
similar terms by Jellinek. Yet if we want to link citizenship as a bundle of rights to its external 
aspect as a legal status of persons in international law, there is another relevant distinction 
which has found much less attention in the theory. Citizenship rights may be external in the 
sense of being enjoyed also by those who live outside their state of nationality, or internal 
because they depend on residing in the territory. On the one hand, citizens travelling or living 
permanently abroad enjoy a number of rights that retain their link with the state whose 
passport they carry.12 On the other hand, it is also obvious that internal citizens enjoy a much 
more comprehensive set of rights than both citizens outside the territory and foreigners in the 
territory. Some of these internal rights have over time become tied to residence or employment 
rather than to the formal status of citizenship so that foreign immigrants can now also enjoy 
them. Tomas Hammar has introduced the term ‘denizenship’ to characterize the legal position 
of long-term foreign residents, which since 1945 has gradually approached that of citizens in a 
number of Western democracies (Hammar 1990).13 A thin conception of citizenship as a 
bundle of legal rights can therefore reach beyond the narrow framework of ‘nationality’. The 
status of citizenship generates rights outside the sphere of territorial sovereignty, and rights 
have expanded beyond the formal status within this sphere. 
Thin conceptions of citizenship differ from thick ones in regarding rights as prior to obligations. 
The fundamental reason for the priority of rights is that every political order is coercive (Larmore 
1996:137-8, 220). Individuals can only rationally consent to being subjected to an authority that 
may legitimately coerce them if this order not only respects their freedom and rights but is 
 
11 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 
24. 
12 The most important among these is the right to return to this state without being subjected to immigration 
restrictions. The other fundamental external right is that to diplomatic protection. However, many states go far 
beyond this minimum by also granting their citizens an absentee ballot or the right to pass on their citizenship to 
their children born abroad. External citizenship also involves rights under international law towards the state of 
residence. Foreign citizens are, in some aspects, even privileged compared to internal citizens. The property and 
liberties of the former are to a lesser extent exposed to the jurisdiction of their state of residence and diplomatic 
protection itself is a significant exemption from the general rule of territorial sovereignty (Goodin 1988). 
13 Soysal (1994) interprets this as a recasting of (national) rights of citizens as (human) rights of persons. In 
my view, this development signifies neither a limit (Soysal 1994) nor a decline (Jacobson 1996) of citizenship, but 
rather a widening range of inclusion that still refers to particular ties of residence or origin. 
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necessary to maintain them in the first place. The basic obligation of citizenship to obey the 
law is therefore conditional upon the rights provided by the same legal order. As T.H. Marshall 
pointed out, other moral duties “to live the life of a good citizen, giving such services as one 
can to promote the welfare of the community” are rather vague “because the community is so 
large that the obligation appears remote and unreal” (Marshall 1965:129). This asymmetry 
characterizes not only the liberal legitimation of political authority but also the bundle of legal 
rights and obligations of citizenship in liberal democracies. There is “a changing balance 
between rights and duties. Rights have been multiplied, and they are precise” (ibid.:129). But 
the core legal obligations are few - paying taxes, compulsory education and military service - 
and they are not equal obligations for all citizens in the same way as basic rights are. In order 
to become universal, rights such as the franchise had first to be disconnected from the unequal 
obligations of taxpaying or conscription.  
Thick conceptions of citizenship often accept this priority of rights as a correct diagnosis of 
contemporary liberal democracy, but deplore it from a normative perspective. Socialist, 
nationalist and communitarian theories fear that the liberal priority for rights promotes the 
bourgeois rather than the citizen, disconnects the individual from the causes of the nation or 
encourages the narrow interests of particular groups against the common good of the polity. 
Although the community is large and anonymous and although the rights they enjoy no longer 
depend on their individual contributions, citizens should learn to think about the polity as if it 
were an extended family, a circle of friends or an association whose members are tied to each 
other by special obligations. Excessive individualism and group particularism are the major ills 
of liberal democracy, which can only be cured by inculcating in citizens a strong sense of 
obligation. 
Civic republicanism appears to occupy again a middle ground with regard to the proper balance 
between rights and obligations. At the heart of the republican vision are rights that are 
simultaneously obligations for their bearers.14 And while enjoying civil rights make individuals 
members of a civil society, only those rights that go along with obligations make them 
members of a self-governing polity. Core rights that fall into this category are those of public 
education, political participation, resistance against oppression and military service in the 
defence of the republic. These republican rights are at the same time moral duties and where 
citizens fail to perform them states can legitimately turn them into legally enforceable 
obligations. All states do so with regard to education requirements, but they may also extend 
the scope of rights as obligations by drafting soldiers or by obligatory voting. 
 
14 This contrasts with the liberal emphasis on rights like freedom of association and the protection of property, 
which impose corresponding obligations of non-interference on other citizens and on the state. 
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Practices and virtues 
The communitarian and republican emphasis on obligations promotes the active citizen and 
leads quite naturally to the idea of citizenship as a practice rather than a mere legal status of 
bearers of rights. This brings us finally to the last row in table 1. Of course, all rights of 
citizenship create ranges of action protected by the law. However, while thin liberal citizenship 
protects autonomous practices of citizens who pursue their own private goals, it does not 
necessarily generate practices of citizenship. The liberal regime of rights merely allows for 
active citizenship but cannot directly bring it about. If civil and political rights are formulated as 
negative liberties, this means that refraining from a protected action is just as legitimate as 
performing it. Citizens are free to form voluntary associations or to vote, but do not have to 
engage in these practices. Social rights are different because they involve positive benefits 
rather than non-interference.15 However, here the emphasis is on the agency of providing 
institutions rather than of citizens, whose role is generally that of recipients rather than of 
agents. In a purely rights-based conception, citizenship may then remain a merely passive 
status. From some perspectives this is not to be deplored. In a Schumpeterian theory of 
democracy, it is safer to leave the business of governing to competent élites and to reduce the 
involvement of citizens to a periodic opportunity to deselect bad leaders (Schumpeter 1950). 
Likewise, for libertarians extending citizenship beyond negative liberties entails a dual danger 
of empowering the state to encroach on individual freedom (e.g. by levying taxes for 
redistributive social rights) and of empowering tyrannical majorities (e.g. through plebiscitarian 
forms of political participation). 
For thicker conceptions, the egotistic individual who uses his or her liberties only in order to 
pursue private interests and the passive citizen who does not care to form and defend a 
political opinion or to cast a vote are not full members of the polity. In their view, the polity is 
not only sustained by a mode of legitimation which emphasizes mutual obligations, but also by 
practices in which citizens must engage so that the imagined political community becomes a 
real experience in their daily lives. In this regard the idea of citizenship as a practice goes 
beyond the moral discourse about political obligations.16 A political community that lives up to 
the standards of communitarian or republican expectations is one where citizens do not have 
to be reminded of their obligations but identify their private interest with the common good and 
habitually engage in public practices of good citizenship. Civic virtues do not present 
themselves as legal obligations, i.e. commandments issued by an external authority. Their 
habitual character distinguishes them also from the imperative nature of moral duties that are 
 
15 The distinction between negative and positive rights is often misleading or overdrawn (Sen 1984). 
Protecting civil rights requires not merely non-interference by the state, but also the protection against 
interference by others and therefore a police force; the franchise cannot be exercised without the public 
provision of voter registers, ballots and voting booths. 
16 The emphasis on virtuous practices is also characteristic for an Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy 
which contrasts with the duty-based approaches of deontological as well as utilitarian theories (see Larmore 
1996, chapter 1).  
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personally experienced as the call of an internal conscience defending a higher moral 
standpoint detached from individual interests. 
When nationalists write about the virtues of citizens they emphasize the readiness to kill or die 
in battle for the survival or the expansion of the community. However, the virtues of citizenship 
are only at rare occasions heroic ones which involve sacrificing one’s property, social status or 
even one’s life for the sake of the polity. These are called for when the community is threatened 
by enemies from outside or by authoritarian power from inside. In the former case conscription 
is anyway enforced as a legal obligations. The major and constant danger in liberal democracy 
is slackness in citizenship practices. Education is not enough to acquire the civic virtues that 
are required against this danger and their rhetorical invocation is not sufficient to sustain them. 
What is needed is constant practices that make good citizenship a widespread habit (van 
Gunsteren 1998). In a certain sense, these citizenship practices can be learned only ‘on the 
job.’ This leaves open the question of which kinds of public policies and institutional reforms 
could foster civic virtues without unduly constraining the rights and liberties of citizenship.17 
There are three different ways of looking at the controversies between thin libertarian and thick 
communitarian conceptions of citizenship. One is to regard them as irreconcilable opposites. 
We would then have to choose between either the left row or the right row of table 1. The 
second option is to see them as endpoints of a continuum. Positions somewhere between the 
extremes, such as liberal republican ones, are then not necessarily messy compromises but 
could be coherent and intellectually appealing. I would, however, opt for a third and deliberately 
eclectic strategy that allows for various recombinations of the dimensions and conceptions. 
We choose one position as a starting point rather than as a complete conception and expand 
it gradually as we find it necessary to include the concerns addressed by apparently rival 
theories. In this way we could chart a path through the conceptual maze of citizenship. Unless 
we already have a clear target before our eyes we will need a sort of compass for this venture. 
The norms of equal and full membership, which I have suggested initially as defining principles 
of citizenship, could serve as such a guideline.  
Starting from thick conceptions of citizenship carries not only the danger of producing a sterile 
contrast between idealized assumptions about political community, on the one hand, and 
‘degenerate’ citizenship in actually existing liberal democracies, on the other hand. It will also 
blind us to some of the most important challenges for citizenship in contemporary societies, 
which have to do with the allocation of membership and rights. Thick conceptions generally 
take the dimensions of membership and rights for granted and see the central task in enriching 
them with obligations and practices. Their view of the polity is an internal one that presupposes 
clearly defined external boundaries, full inclusion and equal rights as given features of 
 
17 “While citizenship theorists bemoan the excessive focus given to rights, they seem reluctant to propose any 
policies that could be seen as restricting those rights” (Kymlicka and Norman 1994:368-9). 
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democratic nation-states. However, as I have pointed out in the introduction, none of these 
achievements is really so obvious and unchallenged. Starting from a thin conception of 
membership as a legal status will allow us to draw a more complex and more realistic picture 
of contemporary citizenship conflicts than can usually be found in republican and 
communitarian accounts.  
2. Differentiated memberships 
I will argue in this section, first, that principles guiding the allocation of citizens to states in the 
international state system pursue contradictory aims and produce unintended results. Second, 
I want to show that, far from being already sufficiently respected in existing policies of 
allocating citizenship, liberal democratic norms would demand quite radical reforms. Third, I 
suggest that citizenship theories have also tended to ignore the contestation of territorial 
boundaries between and within states by nationalist movements. My conclusion is that the 
outcome of applying these norms to the present state system is a structure of vertical and 
horizontal multiplicity of membership which requires a corresponding differentiation of 
citizenship rights. 
The allocation of nationality 
Legal theory generally considers states as a unity of three elements: territory, population and 
political authority. Political authority is then, on the one hand, grounded in territorial 
sovereignty, which turns every person present in this territory into an addressee of the laws, 
while the idea of popular sovereignty, on the other hand, refers to a set of persons who are 
defined as members of the polity rather than as residents in the territory. Before the 
introduction of universal adult franchise, the difference between both sets of populations was 
marked by gender, class and racist barriers. Although such markers of identity still serve in 
many ways to exclude groups from equal access and participation, legal equality has been 
largely achieved along these dimensions. This leaves the status of resident foreign citizens as 
the major remaining instance of formal exclusion. Their subjection to territorial sovereignty 
without representation in the making of laws is a deviation from the basic norms of democratic 
legitimation of political authority. At the same time, their continuing external citizenship in the 
polity of origin is a limitation on the territorial sovereignty of their state of residence. Migration 
produces a double incongruity between territorial and popular sovereignty. Internally, the polity 
does not include every permanent resident person and externally it extends into the territory of 
other states. Congruity would imply that the order of membership in polities matches the 
allocation of territories to states. In the contemporary world each point on the land mass of the 
globe belongs at any given point in time to one state and to one state only. A matching order of 
membership would have the same boundaries as state territories and be similarly complete 
and discrete so that there is neither statelessness nor multiple nationality. 
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The simplest way to resolve this contradiction would be a continuous reallocation of citizenship 
which automatically naturalizes every resident and denaturalizes every emigrant after a certain 
time.18 The deviations generated by migration would then be only temporary and could thus be 
reconciled with maintaining a general norm of congruity. However, this solution clashes again 
with a second set of principles pertaining to liberal democratic rights and to the scope of state 
sovereignty. It violates, first, the idea that legitimate political authority can only be exercised 
over persons whose membership is voluntary. Because of the coercive nature and the pervasive 
impact of political decisions for the life of individuals, the criteria for voluntary membership in a 
polity differ from those of voluntary associations in civil society.19 Membership is normally 
acquired without consent at birth and liberal states cannot exclude their members like a club. 
The two remaining tests for voluntary affiliation to a democratic polity are that no adult foreigner 
can be naturalized without her consent and that emigrants must be allowed to voluntarily 
renounce their citizenship of origin. Automatic naturalization or denaturalization would violate 
these requirements of consent.20  
This solution would also contradict a principle enshrined in international law according to which 
it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals.21 Such a right of ‘self-
determination’ in the allocation of citizenship has been a traditional core aspect of sovereignty 
jealously guarded by states against attempts to impose effective constraints in international 
law or to move towards international harmonization of the rules for loss and acquisition of 
citizenship.22 The paradoxes of this situation are highlighted in the European context, where 
access to the common status of EU citizenship is regulated by the 15 different nationality laws 
of the member states. Although there is some European convergence in this area that results 
from shared democratic standards and similar conditions concerning permanent immigration 
(Weil 1999),23 so far the institutions of the EU have not dared to harmonize the nationality laws 
of their member states. 
 
18 Alternatively, one might suggest a universal rule of ius soli for the transmission of citizenship between 
generations. However, this solution fails for two reasons. First, the problems of incongruity cannot be regarded 
as merely temporary if they put a whole generation of migrants in an irregular position and, second, those who 
obtain a citizenship by ius soli will end up in the same irregular status once they leave their country of birth. 
19 See Bauböck (1994:160-177) for a discussion of the difference between voluntary membership in a polity 
and other types of association. 
20 These constraints are of rather recent origin. Nationality laws in 19th century Europe often gave states 
wide powers to denaturalize their citizens or to refuse voluntary expatriation. Some states also naturalized 
foreigners without their consent. The author of a recent book argues that – provided that multiple nationality is 
tolerated – automatic naturalization could be reintroduced as a way of guaranteeing the inclusion of foreign 
residents (Rubio-Marín 2000). 
21 The Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930, Art. 1. 
22 In its Nottebohm decision of 1955 the International Court of Justice constrained an arbitrary handing out of 
citizenship by requiring some effective link between citizens and states (see Bar Yakoov 1961). 
23 Although all continental European laws are primarily based on ius sanguinis, most immigration countries 
provide now for facilitated, optional or automatic naturalization for those born in their territory or with parents 
themselves born in the territory. Many laws have made it easier for naturalization candidates to retain their 
previous nationality. Finally, waiting periods and other requirements for discretionary naturalization tend to be 
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Liberal democracies differ in their rules for naturalization and, more importantly, also in their 
rules for the transmission of citizenship to new generations. Efforts to adopt binding rules for 
avoiding the irregularities of statelessness and multiple nationality have so far been rather 
unsuccessful.24 The problem is deeper than just a lack of coordination. Most states whose 
governments still regard dual citizenship as undesirable systematically contribute to its 
proliferation. Those which pass on their citizenship by ius sanguinis thereby produce dual 
citizenship for the offspring of mixed marriages as well as for all children of their emigrants in 
ius soli states. And countries which adopt ius soli for births in their territory, such as the US or 
Canada, at the same time use a principle of descent for attributing their citizenship to children 
born to their emigrants living elsewhere. 
The inclusion of migrants 
Our initial definition of citizenship as full and equal membership in a liberal democratic polity 
suggests alternative principles for the allocation of nationality. The first step in such an 
argument is to interpret full membership as referring not only to a comprehensive range of 
rights, but also to a comprehensive inclusion of persons. The question is then how to 
determine the range of persons to be included. As our discussion has just shown, republican 
and nationalist ambitions to create non-overlapping sets of membership are self-defeating. If all 
polities have the sovereign power to determine their own boundaries they cannot be prevented 
from naturalizing another state’s citizens and cannot be forced to release or denaturalize their 
emigrants when these acquire another nationality. And if membership is determined by descent 
or cultural belonging, migration will inevitably generate mixed cases. The alternative is to apply 
the principles for the allocation of rights also to the admission to, and exit from, the legal 
status. A right to citizenship should then be inclusive and optional in the same way as the 
rights of citizenship. Such an individual right to citizenship would have several components: A 
first element is strong protection against statelessness resulting from denaturalization, from 
cases where neither ius soli nor ius sanguinis apply at birth25 and from exclusionary initial 
definitions of citizenship in newly formed states.26 A second element is an individual right to 
the citizenship of the country where one has been born or has been resident for several 
years.27 A third feature would allow individuals to retain their external citizenship after 
                                                                                                                                          
reduced. There are, however, still significant exceptions to each of these trends. The recent reform of German 
nationality has joined the first and third trends, while sounding a retreat on the second one. Among EU members, 
Austria, Luxemburg and Greece have remained exceptionally restrictive in their nationality laws. 
24 The 1963 Council of Europe Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality has been recently 
replaced by a 1997 European Convention on Nationality that is much more permissive in this regard. This new 
convention also addresses the problem of statelessness, which has reemerged on a massive scale as a result 
of the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
25 E.g. children found in the territory after birth whose parents’ citizenship cannot be determined.  
26 After gaining independence Estonia and Latvia adopted nationality laws that imposed long waiting periods 
and harsh admission requirements on their Russian minorities. See Brubaker (1992). 
27  For a defence of this right see Carens (1989). 
I H S — Rainer Bauböck / Recombinant Citizenship — 13 
emigration but also to renounce it if they so wish upon acquiring the new citizenship of their 
state of residence.28  
These interpretations of full inclusion do not balance the concerns of democratic legitimacy and 
state sovereignty in a symmetrical way but clearly side with the former against the latter. 
Including the resident population in the polity is more important than the dubious state privilege 
of controlling admission to its membership.29 And the democratic principle with regard to the 
determination of membership is not to let a majority decide who ought to be accepted as a 
citizen, but to admit all those who are already subjected to political decisions by virtue of their 
permanent residence in the territory. Furthermore, the rights of emigrants to maintain their ties 
to societies of origin are more important than concerns about diminished territorial sovereignty 
or about conflicting loyalties among dual citizens. Yet the minimal criteria of voluntary 
membership have to be respected, too, and this implies an individual option not to adopt the 
citizenship of one’s state of residence. Migrants may have many different reasons not to 
naturalize. Some fear the loss of external citizenship rights in their countries of origin or react 
to ethnic discrimination by turning their nationality into a symbol of collective identity and pride. 
Privileged migrants (such as EU citizens in other member states of the Union) mostly feel that 
naturalization would only marginally improve their position. As a result, citizenship as a legal 
status cannot be made fully inclusive in liberal democracies exposed to transnational 
migration. This is, however, no serious limitation because the range of inclusion ought to refer 
primarily to citizenship rights rather than to nationality as a status. The answer to the deficit is 
to extend rights of citizenship to permanent residents foreigners. Suppose these ‘denizens’ 
enjoy all basic liberties and social rights of citizens as well as the local vote and other avenues 
of political representation. Under such conditions the national franchise and access to high 
public offices could remain tied to the formal status without a serious problem for democratic 
legitimacy. Foreign residents could choose to obtain these core rights of political citizenship by 
naturalizing. Moreover, immigrants would then no longer naturalize in order to escape legal 
discrimination to which they are exposed as aliens. Removing this instrumental incentive may 
lower application rates but will also create conditions under which naturalization can be 
motivated by a wish to fully belong to the polity and by a commitment to participate in its 
political affairs, i.e. the sort of reasons communitarian and republican conceptions of thick 
citizenship are keen to promote.30 
While this suggests how a conception that starts from legal membership and liberal rights can 
take into account concerns about citizenship obligations and practices, it is obvious that these 
should not serve as a pretext for exclusion. In strong republican versions of citizenship, the 
 
28 These principles leave considerable space for variations in implementation. They do not require, for 
example, automatic ius soli for the first generation of immigrant origin born in the territory. 
29 This does not imply that states are equally constrained in controlling admission to their territories. See 
Bauböck (1994: chapter 13), Bader (1997). 
30 See Bauböck (1994:102-115). 
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very act of emigrating (unless it is motivated by political oppression) has been regarded as an 
illoyalty by which citizens put themselves outside the political community. Nationalist 
conceptions have insisted on an indissoluble bond of allegiance, which can neither be 
voluntarily renounced after emigration nor voluntarily acquired after immigration. In contrast with 
both these approaches, a liberal one has to make the rules of citizenship compatible with 
migratory practices. In this view, migration is not an obstacle, but a test case for the voluntary 
character of membership in a liberal polity. It puts individuals in a position where they confront 
a positive choice of affiliation that most native born citizens never have to face. Providing the 
adequate options for this essential choice while securing a maximally inclusive polity are the 
two goals which together require a transnational differentiation of citizenship. 
Prima facie, the outcome of such full inclusion of migrants seems to violate the other core 
norm of equality. Instead of one single status that is the same for all members we get a variety 
of relations of individuals to the polity: External and internal citizens, transient migrants and 
denizens,31 citizens with one and with more than one nationality would differ in a number of 
ways in terms of their rights and their membership status. It could seem that this differentiation 
reintroduces a structure of inequality which had been overcome when class and gender 
distinctions between passive and active citizenship were abolished. Yet this worry confuses 
equality with homogeneity.32 As Ronald Dworkin (1977), Charles Larmore (1996) and other 
theorists have pointed out, the basic norm for liberal democracy is equal respect, not equal 
treatment. Identity of legal status is one instance of equal treatment and can be overridden by 
concerns of equal respect for individuals who are differently positioned. Under conditions of 
transnational mobility, equal respect for natives and migrants means recognizing the specific 
bonds of the latter to societies of origin as well as destination. And this can only be done by 
differentiating both formal membership and rights. 
Since World War II liberal democracies have to some extent followed this path. However, apart 
from rare exceptions they have not explicitly embraced the underlying normative principles. 
Contrary to the by now irreversible formal inclusion of groups previously excluded on the basis 
of class, gender, religion or race, the inclusion of migrants remains precarious. Western 
democracies have clung to a conception of sovereignty which allows for tightening the 
admission to citizenship as well as for depriving resident foreigners of rights already granted to 
 
31 Not all kinds of human mobility generate claims to an extensive range of citizenship rights in the country of 
present abode. While tourists and traveling professionals or business people do need access to basic civil rights, 
they will remain legitimately excluded from the political franchise and many social rights. It is their prolonged 
residence, which turns them into members of society and exposes them to the long-term effects of political 
decisions, that gives immigrants a claim to more extensive citizenship. 
32 This false dichotomy has been criticized in feminist theory as well as in theories of multiculturalism. For 
recent statements see Lister (1997: 91-100) or Parekh (1998). 
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them. In the 1990s we have witnessed a wave of such exclusionary policies even in traditional 
societies of immigration, such as the US, Australia or France.33 
The allocation of territory 
A second major difficulty for mainstream theories of citizenship, which take the membership 
dimension for granted, emerges from ethnic and national diversity within democratic polities. 
The most radical challenge is raised by nationalist movements for secession or unification like 
those in Québec or in Northern Ireland. Liberal theorists have advocated two contrary principles 
of how to deal with such claims for revising the territorial borders of existing states. One school 
defends the view that secession is only justified if a state explicitly discriminates against an 
ethnic group and thus seriously fails to treat all its citizens equally,34 while the other camp 
suggests that democratic legitimacy requires not only an individual right to emigrate, but also 
the right of collective exit by secession for any regional majority.35 These two opposed liberal 
theories of legitimate secession derived from injustice or from choice confront a nationalist 
approach, which attributes a right to form an independent states to entities with a claim to 
nationhood and regards secession as an ultimate but legitimate way of transforming 
multinational states into nation-states.36 
This is a complex debate which I cannot even attempt to summarize here.37 The parallel with 
the challenge of migration is that there are situations in which groups of individuals who live 
within the territory of a state conceive of themselves as members of a distinct political 
community different from the polity of their state of residence, and often are also regarded by 
national majorities as less than full members. The difference is that migration involves the 
question to which extent individuals can choose and combine different forms of membership 
and bundles of citizenship rights offered by existing states, while secession raises the 
question whether groups can choose the shape of the state to which they want to belong. I 
believe that a choice-based approach to secession is not acceptable because it would fatally 
undermine the stability of political association which is a precondition for the protective as well 
as the liberating effects of democratic citizenship.38 The nationalist interpretation of self-
determination has much the same effect by creating an incentive for breaking up multinational 
 
33 The 1996 Welfare Reform Act in the US deprived resident citizens of benefits in most federal cash 
assistance programmes; in 1996 the Australian government increased waiting periods for welfare benefits to two 
years for new immigrants; in 1993 France abolished the automatic acquisition of nationality at majority by persons 
born in France of immigrant parents. The US reform has been partially reversed and the French reform has been 
fully reversed since. 
34 Buchanan (1991), Habermas (1996:163-171), Chwaszcza (1997). 
35 Beran (1984) Gauthier (1994), Wellman (1995), Pogge (1997).  
36 Raz and Margalit (1990), Miller (1995, chapter 4). For more recent contributions to the secession debate see 
Lehning (1998) and Moore (1998). 
37 For a more extensive discussion see Bauböck (1999). 
38 This caveat substantiates my earlier objections against a contractual conception of the polity that regards it 
as a purely voluntary association. 
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states. Given the large and potentially ever-increasing number of would-be nations a principle of 
self-determination that is no longer constrained by present concerns for the territorial integrity 
of existing states is a recipe for the proliferation of violent conflict. Moreover, the argument first 
advanced by John Stuart Mill and recently restated by David Miller that “free institutions are 
next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities” (Mill 1972:392, Miller 
1995:98) has lost much of its plausibility in view of powerful tendencies towards growing ethnic, 
religious and national diversity even within relatively homogeneous liberal democracies. 
However, the position that existing borders should never be challenged as long as all citizens 
enjoy full and equal individual membership is also hard to accept. It rests on a republican 
dogma of unique and homogeneous membership that does not allow for federal arrangements 
in which regional units with a distinct cultural character are perceived as autonomous political 
communities within the larger polity.39 Actual political conflicts about secession nearly always 
emerge from such a federation between previously or potentially autonomous communities. 
And the grievances upon which secessionists build their case are not necessarily about 
individual discrimination, but often about a violation of federal arrangements that grant 
minorities self-government in their territories and special representation in the institutions of the 
larger state. This explains why secessionist conflicts have not only emerged in oppressive 
regimes but also in liberal democracies. The proper answer to these challenges is not to 
transform all such multinational federations into homogeneous nation-states. This could only 
be achieved by oppressive means. The only alternative for liberal democracies is to negotiate 
fair terms of federation that allow minorities partial self-government but at the same time involve 
them in the collective decisions of the larger polity and thereby commit them also towards a 
common future of that state.40 Such a federalist approach allows therefore, once more, to 
develop the dimensions of obligations and practices of citizenship without defining the larger 
polity as their exclusive focus. Minority members may well develop dual loyalties which need 
not contradict each other as long as the terms of federation are fair. 41 
This response implicitly relies on the premise that a collective desire for self-government which 
has been asserted over several generations should be taken as a sufficient indicator for the 
existence of a political community, but not as a sufficient reason to claim independent 
statehood. While a morally plausible challenge to existing borders has to provide evidence of 
severe collective grievances, the liberal paradigm of choice ought to prevail in recognizing the 
 
39 In the US-American tradition, republicanism embraces regional federalism because it allows for smaller-
scale self-government and as part of the system of checks and balances. But it vehemently opposes the idea of 
multinational federation, which articulates the distinct national identities of various parts of the federation. In 
Europe, Germany and Austria are regional federal states, whereas Belgium, Switzerland and Spain approach a 
multinational model. 
40 For a more extensive statement of this argument see Bauböck (2000). 
41 The Italian-Austrian settlement of the ethnic conflict in South Tyrol, the transformation of postfrancist Spain 
into an estado de las autonomías and the recent devolution in Scotland and Wales can be mentioned as by and 
large successful European examples. 
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self-definition of groups as political communities. For national minorities, just as for migrants, 
full inclusion and equal membership cannot be achieved short of taking into account their 
special ties to different political communities. In the case of minorities, a basic reason for this 
is that the public culture of every liberal democracy is deeply immersed in particular traditions. 
This is most obviously true for linguistic identities. Unless minorities enjoy special 
representation and partial autonomy they will be disadvantaged in a public sphere dominated 
by cultural majorities (Kymlicka 1989, chapter 9). For a theory of citizenship, the consequence 
is that the misguided ideal of homogeneity ought to be abandoned in favour of acknowledging 
two kinds of multiplicity of membership: horizontal multiplicity that emerges from migration, 
and vertical multiplicity that results from recognizing the inclusion of distinct political 
communities in the wider polity. 
Conclusions 
This line of thought can be continued in two different directions: one by extending the idea of 
federation from the subnational level to supranational and even global levels, and the other one 
by supplementing the theory of national minority rights with those of ethnic, cultural and 
religious groups who cannot reasonable claim territorial autonomy. The foremost example for 
how supranational federation can lead to a new kind of citizenship is, of course, the European 
Union. In this case a federation driven by a desire for lasting peace and common interests in 
economic integration has developed into a project of becoming a supranational polity without 
aspiring for the full sovereignty of a traditional federal state. Union citizenship was formally 
introduced in the Maastricht Treaty in order to symbolically claim democratic legitimacy for this 
project. Yet, as I have argued above, it is still a highly ambiguous construction both in terms of 
the allocation of membership and because of the meager bundle of rights associated with being 
a citizen of the Union.42 
The other extension of the theory would take up the debate about multiculturalism.43 This 
controversy illustrates how a former focus on the diversity of interests in the economy and civil 
society has been gradually replaced by a new emphasis on the diversity of collective identities, 
with a growing fear that these undermine the cohesive force of common citizenship in the 
polity. One way to link this debate to citizenship theory is to ask whether cultural rights should 
be added as a separate dimension to the Marshallian triad of civil, political and economic ones. 
 
42 On the latter point see Shaw (1997). 
43 The idea of differentiated citizenship was first introduced by Iris Young in a defence of special 
representation for culturally or economically oppressed groups (Young 1989). Kymlicka and Norman (1994) have 
applied it to the accommodation of cultural and national identities. More recently Lister (1997) has argued for 
‘differentiated universalism’ as a general approach to citizenship. 
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Another key theme is whether and how group-differentiated and collective rights are compatible 
with a framework of equal individual citizenship.44 
The following diagram illustrates the three structures of differentiated membership that result 
from multinational federalism, transnational migration and multicultural citizenship. Federalism 
creates a vertically nested multiple membership so that each citizen is a member of both a 
self-governing subunit and the wider federation. Transnational migration creates horizontally 
overlapping multiple membership, most visibly in the case of formal dual citizenship, but also 
by extending citizenship rights to permanent resident foreigners and to emigrants outside the 
territory. Multicultural citizenship, finally, introduces group differentiated rights into a shared 
framework of equal citizenship by recognizing particular collective identities related to gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, racial discrimination or ethnic background. 
Diagram 1: Three structures of differentiated citizenship 
 
federal multiple citizenship 
vertically nested 
transnational multiple 
citizenship horizontally 
overlapping 
multicultural citizenship group 
differentiated 
  
Both supranational federation and cultural diversity are difficult questions for citizenship theory, 
which I cannot try to answer in this brief sketch. Yet even raising them as problems illustrates 
the inadequacy of approaches that rely on an idealized image of homogeneous polities. In 
contemporary liberal democracies, diversity is no longer confined to the realm of civil society, 
but infects the polity itself. Citizenship provides a link between social integration and political 
 
44 See the excellent collection edited by Kymlicka and Shapiro (1997). 
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legitimacy that necessarily reflects this diversity in its rules for determining membership and in 
its specification of rights and obligations. I have tried to outline a perspective that is sensitive to 
this political spill-over effect of social change. If I ought to suggest a label for it I would call it 
‘liberal pluralism’. It differs not only from republican, communitarian and nationalist 
conceptions, which build upon a thick conception of citizenship that is no longer adequate for 
complex modern societies, but also from traditional liberal conceptions, which have paid little 
attention to the contested boundaries of political community in Western democracies. Yet 
liberal pluralistic citizenship is not a completely novel and alternative perspective. It uses the 
established dimensions and conceptions of citizenship, rearranging and recombining them in 
response to persistent or new forms of exclusion.  
Citizenship has always an exclusionary side.45 It needs territorial borders as well as 
boundaries of membership. But large-scale migration and multiple collective identities 
transform some external boundaries into internal ones. European societies are increasingly 
exposed to both kinds of changes and their conception of citizenship ought to respond to this 
fact. 
 
45 See Bader (1997). 
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